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I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment of the Bill of Rights gives Americans and
legal entities a panoply of rights to express themselves and choose
with whom they wish to associate.1 However, this right is not absolute, particularly when commercial speech is involved.2 Pharmaceutical companies have historically been restricted by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the scope of their advertising, and are generally relegated to the advertisement of their drugs for the FDAapproved usage.3 While there is legislation that governs this practice
motivated by policy concerns,4 the decision to restrict pharmaceutical
companies’ right to commercial speech is also made in light of the
target population’s First Amendment right to not be given information that it does not want to hear. This is especially the case when
* I would like to thank Professor Frederick M. Abbott, Edward Ball Eminent Scholar Professor, and Professor Marshall B. Kapp for their deep understanding of public health
and pharmaceutical law; their instruction provided me with a firm knowledge base from
which to write this Note. As always, I would like to thank my wife, Nora Bailey, for her
continued support and unwavering confidence in me; without her, this Note would not have
been possible.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (laying out a four-part test for analyzing whether the government can restrict
commercial speech: (1) if the speech is lawful and is not false or misleading; (2) if the
speech restriction pertains to a substantial government interest; (3) if the state’s asserted
substantial interest is directly advanced by the restriction; and (4) if the restriction was
narrowly tailored to effectuate the state’s interest).
3. See, e.g., Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196,
206, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that off-label advertisement of pharmaceuticals has traditionally been regulated by the FDA, but holding that under Central Hudson, Amarin is
likely to succeed in a First Amendment challenge against the FDA, and thus, will be able
to advertise off-label use of Vascepa).
4. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).

1484

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1483

people are targeted by pharmaceutical companies because they are
identified as particularly at risk for having a disease.5
With the innovation of smart computers and massive data pools of
health information, pharmaceutical companies have more power than
ever to gather information about prospective customers and target
advertising to them. The American Medical Association has spoken
out against pharmaceutical advertising because of the companies’
ability to influence consumer thought and demand treatment for
conditions that they may not have or for which they may not need
treatment. 6 Historically, the FDA regulated pharmaceutical advertising to restrict companies to promoting only their products’ FDAapproved uses, but that power has been called into question through
a string of litigation that has left the constitutionality of FDA regulation of this particular type of commercial speech uncertain.7
In an era of unprecedented surveillance capabilities8 and waning
power to regulate pharmaceutical advertising,9 the population of the
United States faces a situation in which their personal information
may be obtained without consent and they may be targeted by pharmaceutical companies for drugs whose suggested uses are not approved by
the FDA. There are several ways by which pharmaceutical advertisement and use could be monitored, but there are numerous practical and
legal considerations inherent in any surveillance mechanism.
Part II of this Note discusses the current regulatory framework
and limitations surrounding pharmaceutical research and development, advertisement, and post-approval monitoring. Part III addresses the practical and legal implications of developments in technology and recent litigation with respect to pharmaceutical companies’ ability to advertise. Part IV addresses the practical and legal
implications surrounding the surveillance of advertisement, prescription, and use of pharmaceuticals. Part V concludes that the FDA is
currently outpaced by the resources and legal protections afforded to
5. See Benjamin E. Berkman & Sara Chandros Hull, The “Right Not to Know” in the
Genomic Era: Time to Break from Tradition?, AM. J. BIOETHICS 28, 28-29 (2014) (describing

the doctrine of the right not to know and the paradigm shift that genetic testing is raising).
6. Frederick M. Abbott, Professor, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Lecture on Global
Pharmaceutical Law (Jan.-May 2016) [hereinafter Global Pharmaceutical Law Lecture] (on
file with author).
7. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that drug representatives marketing pharmaceuticals for off-label use is constitutionally protected
speech if it satisfies the Central Hudson factors); Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 226-27.
8. See Jennifer S. Bard, Putting Patients First: How the FDA Could Use Its Existing
Powers to Reduce Post-Market Adverse Events, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 495, 524-25 (2013).
9. FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & GRAHAM DUKES, GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL POLICY:
ENSURING MEDICINES FOR TOMORROW’S WORLD 92-93 (2009) (citing Arthur Daemmerich in
tracking the ebb and flow of the FDA’s power in the twentieth century).
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pharmaceutical companies and that the FDA must change in fundamental ways to combat the health crisis induced by rampant
pharmaceutical advertising.
II. THE FDA AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT: THE PROCEDURE, POLICY,
AND LIMITATIONS SURROUNDING PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION
The FDA had humble beginnings, with little authority to regulate
the safety and efficacy of drugs on the market.10 However, largely in
response to the elixir sulfanilamide disaster of 1938, the FDA’s power
expanded to address the research and development of drugs before
they hit the market—ultimately coming to resemble its current form
after the United States narrowly avoided the thalidomide disaster
thanks to the direction of Dr. Frances Kelsey, the FDA assessor at
the time. 11 A common explanation posited by “Big Pharma” 12 for why
originator pharmaceuticals are so expensive 13 is that the process of
research and development is so costly that the price of the new drug
offsets the expenditure of creating it. Aside from moral and ethical
justifications for performing intensive research and development,
this is a necessary step (more accurately, a multi-step process) that
any pharmaceutical company must endure if it hopes to get FDA approval and market exclusivity for its product. It is also worth noting
that in order to export any drug to the United States for marketing
and consumption, manufacturing plants must have FDA-inspected
and -approved production lines. 14
A telling indicator regarding the complexity of the drug approval
process is that the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)
is the largest of the FDA’s six branches—boasting five different types
of drug applications.15 The basic process that all originator pharmaceuticals must endure if they wish to produce is arduous and largely

10. Id.
11. See id. at 92, 96.
12. Big Pharma, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/Big%20Pharma [https://perma.cc/KS4L-NA7C] (defining “Big Pharma” as “large
pharmaceutical companies considered especially as a politically influential group”).
13. “Originator pharmaceuticals” are drugs that are developed, usually by major
pharmaceutical companies, and approved by the FDA for the first time. These are different
from generics, which are biosimilar or identical substances to originator drugs that are
approved by the FDA for marketing, usually after the originator patent has expired. See
Are Generics Really the Same as Branded Drugs?, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/2013/01/10/
are-generics-really-the-same-as-branded-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/H88U-NDRY].
14. Global Pharmaceutical Law Lecture, supra note 6.
15. See A Brief History of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research—Slide
Show, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/
VirtualHistory/HistoryExhibits/ucm325199.htm [https://perma.cc/SMK3-E65R].
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unregulated by the FDA. 16 After developing a drug, testing it in vitro
(in a glass) and in vivo (in a living thing, usually an animal) to decide
if it is potentially therapeutic, and getting a patent from the U.S. Patent and Trade Office, the pharmaceutical company then submits an
Investigational New Drug Application. 17 CDER then evaluates the
application, accessing the drug’s efficacy, safety, and intended use,
among other things. 18 Upon not hearing back from the FDA (which
seems counterintuitive), the pharmaceutical company can then initiate clinical trials using human subjects. 19 There are three phases of
the clinical trial process 20: the first phase tests the drug’s safety at a
range of doses on a limited number of human subjects; the second
phase uses a limited sample of people with the target disease in a
double-blind study to test the safety and efficacy of the drug compared to placebos; and the third phase is a larger clinical trial.21
Completing the phases is a linear process; the drug must pass each
stage before moving on to the next.22 Once the pharmaceutical company has completed phase three, it then submits a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA for evaluation by a team of experts employed by the FDA.23 It usually takes eight to twelve years from the
beginning of research and development for a drug to hit the shelves.24
All of the data from the aforementioned drug development and testing process is relayed to the FDA through an uninterested “sponsor”
of the research.25 While the idea of an uninterested sponsor intuitively appeals to ensuring that the results of studies on which NDAs are
16. FDA’s Role in Public Health: Drug Efficacy, Safety, Quality, and Beyond, FDA
DRUG REGS. [hereinafter FDA’s Role in Public Health], http://fdadrugregulations.
e-paga.com/ (follow “Launch the course;” then follow “Module 1: CDER Product Development and Review”) (last visited Feb. 13, 2017) (explaining that the development of drugs
that are submitted for approval is “pre-clinical research” and is not regulated by the FDA);
Global Pharmaceutical Law Lecture, supra note 6 (explaining it is not until after patent
approval that originators apply for FDA approval).
17. FDA’s Role in Public Health, supra note 16.
18. See New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. F OOD & DRUG ADMIN .,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm [https://perma.cc/5WHV-ER9D].
19. FDA’s Role in Public Health, supra note 16; Global Pharmaceutical Law Lecture,
supra note 6.
20. FDA’s Role in Public Health, supra note 16; Global Pharmaceutical Law Lecture,
supra note 6.
21. FDA’s Role in Public Health, supra note 16; Global Pharmaceutical Law Lecture,
supra note 6.
22. FDA’s Role in Public Health, supra note 16; Global Pharmaceutical Law Lecture,
supra note 6.
23. FDA’s Role in Public Health, supra note 16; Global Pharmaceutical Law Lecture,
supra note 6.
24. Global Pharmaceutical Law Lecture, supra note 6.
25. 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2016).
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founded and approved remain unbiased, the FDA has limited resources to ensure that the studies are reported accurately. 26 The FDA
has the authority to inspect drug development facilities, but it often
does not exercise that power unless given good reason. 27
Because of the limited resources of the FDA and the money that
pharmaceutical companies have to pour into developing new drugs,
the clinical study system is organized in such a way as to demonstrate the efficacy of the drug and limit the potential for adverse drug
events.28 Sponsors also have significant legal and de facto leeway in
what they report to the FDA.29 Along with limited resources through
which to monitor the pre-approval drug development process, there
may also be constitutional and statutory limitations to the FDA’s
ability to ensure the quality of the process. The clinical trial phase of
drug development is the first time that the FDA and researchers get
to observe how developing drugs affect human subjects.30 While sponsors prescreen participants’ medical histories and current drug use to
ensure that confounding variables do not taint the studies, 31 participants are paid to be in clinical trials and may be tempted to withhold
information to be eligible. 32 The FDA does not have the authority to
dictate compensation amounts to try to circumvent this problem.33
The FDA may try to increase scrutiny of the clinical trial process by
requiring sponsors to report medical history and drug use of partici-

26. Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 601-02

(2005).
27. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INFORMATION
SHEET GUIDANCE FOR IRBS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND SPONSORS: FDA
INSPECTIONS OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS 3 (2010), https://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/
SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/GuidancesInformationSheetsandNotices/ucm113709.htm
(follow “FDA Inspections of Clinical Investigators” hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/DTK5-6YQM];
Bard, supra note 8, at 510-11 (explaining that the FDA has the authority to inspect research
facilities but it does not use it as much as it could).
28. Bard, supra note 8, at 504-05 (explaining that the very nature of clinical trials
minimizes the likelihood of adverse effects and the twelve-week length of clinical trials
optimizes showings of drug efficacy while minimizing the manifestation of adverse effects).
29. Id. at 512-14 (explaining that clinical trial sponsors have discretion about what to
report to the FDA and sometimes just flat-out ignore FDA reporting requirements because
there is no penalty for maleficence).
30. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
31. Bard, supra note 8, at 504; Lisa A. Ladewski et al., Dissemination of Information
on Potentially Fatal Adverse Drug Reactions for Cancer Drugs from 2000 to 2002, 21 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3859, 3859-64 (2003).
32. See Mansi Pandya & Chetna Desai, Compensation in Clinical Research: The Debate Continues, 4 PERSP. CLINICAL RES. 70, 70-71 (2013) (describing the current framework
for participant compensation and how it may be changed).
33. Id. at 73.
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pants, but this may run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 34 The
Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights protects actors from unreasonable searches and seizures.35 As it relates to personal drug use, it
is generally not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to test for
drugs if it is intended to be diagnostic and not prosecutorial.36 However, if the FDA imposes any sort of criminal penalty on participants
who lied or failed to disclose their drug use to sponsors during clinical trials, then this may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 37 While one can engage in a long-winded debate about the pros
and cons of having such an expansive premarket evaluation system,
especially as it is a scapegoat for the high prices of originator pharmaceuticals, this Note seeks to give an overview of the process
to couch the FDA’s focus on drug regulation in the context of the
post-approval market.
The FDA’s power to regulate pharmaceutical sales after approval
is generally thought of in terms of regulating the advertisement of
approved drugs. That is, the FDA—with authority derived from the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)—has been understood to be
able to restrict pharmaceutical advertisements to their labeled uses.38
However, this power has recently been called into question in a line of
cases.39 The current legal trend is that the FDA’s power to limit offlabel advertisement is limited to when the advertisement is fraudulent
or misleading,40 not when it is merely for an off-label use that is legitimately prescribed by doctors and has evidence of legitimate use.41
Given that pharmaceutical companies, in getting their products
approved for marketing, must submit an application listing both the
intended (or labeled) use for the drug and that the clinical trials for
the product are designed to test its clinical efficacy for that intended
use, it may appear odd that the FDA cannot regulate legitimate off34. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977) (upholding a New York law requiring physicians to triplicate Schedule II drug prescriptions for reporting); cf. Ferguson v.
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85-86 (2001) (holding that it is an impermissible search and seizure to perform urinalyses without consent for the purpose of criminal prosecution).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (holding that
mandatory urinalyses of train conductors after train accidents was a permissible search
and seizure because it was a company policy). But cf. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85-86.
37. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85-86.
38. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 333(a)(1) (2012).
39. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012); Amarin Pharma,
Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); cf. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 39-41 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding Pfizer’s
off-label advertising of Neurontin constituted actionable fraud).
40. See In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 21.
41. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168; Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 226-27.
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label advertising of a drug by a pharmaceutical company. However,
the issue is not that the FDA cannot regulate off-label distribution /
prescription of a drug but that it cannot generally abridge the First
Amendment rights of the pharmaceutical companies that are advertising the drug for off-label purposes. 42 The court in United States v.
Caronia explained that the FDA has a panoply of regulatory options
if it wishes to restrict off-label use of a drug, but abridging the First
Amendment rights of pharmaceutical companies must be a last resort, not a first. 43 The FDA can regulate speech in certain contexts.
Specifically, such regulation is allowed if it meets the Central Hudson test: (1) the speech pertains to lawful activity and is not false or
misleading (meaning it is protected by the First Amendment); (2) the
speech restriction that the government seeks to impose pertains to a
substantial government interest; (3) the interest is directly advanced
by the restriction; (4) and the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet
its proposed purpose. 44 This is a rigorous standard guarding First
Amendment-protected speech that the FDA has never successfully
surmounted, usually because it fails to satisfy the narrowly tailored
prong of the test. 45 However, when the first prong is not met (meaning it is not protected speech under the First Amendment), the FDA
has successfully prosecuted off-label advertising.46
It is quite apparent that the FDA has an interest in regulating
pharmaceuticals to protect the American public from potentially
dangerous drugs, and one can see why the FDA would want to restrict advertising to FDA-approved, labeled uses of pharmaceuticals.
However, restricting all off-label advertising of pharmaceuticals,
many of which have been proven to effectuate their alternative use,
constitutes a restriction that is too broad.47 In an era of unprecedented media and advertisement capabilities and increasing pressure
from pharmaceutical companies and the public to expedite drug approval, 48 it has become increasingly difficult for the FDA to ensure
the safety and efficacy of drugs advertised in the post-approval mar-

42. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168.
43. Id. (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech
must be a last—not a first—resort.” (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357, 373 (2002))).
44. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980).
45. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 207.
46. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013).
47. See Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 207.
48. ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 9, at 92-93.
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ket. 49 With new mechanisms of targeted advertisement through data
pools, the FDA must adapt its current post-approval surveillance
framework if it hopes to continue preserving the health and safety of
the American public.
III. A NEW ERA OF MARKETING: THE RIGHTS AND TECHNOLOGIES ON
BOTH SIDES OF PHARMACEUTICAL ADVERTISING
In an age where one’s health information can potentially be determined without so much as a cheek swab or even a doctor’s visit,
targeted advertising is becoming a lucrative industry. 50 Pharmaceutical companies are testing the limits of what constitutes permissible
advertising and the FDA appears to be losing ground in its ability to
restrict off-label marketing of approved drugs.51 Pharmaceutical use
in America is concurrently on the rise. 52 Coincidently, or perhaps
consequently, the FDA is under increasing pressure to approve
emerging pharmaceuticals more quickly than standard drug applications allow.53 With the American population at an all-time high and
multi-media technologies more advanced than ever before,54 advertisements can reach an unprecedented number of people with relative ease. To exacerbate this scenario, data pools are becoming an
attractive option for pharmaceuticals to target advertising towards
populations that are statistically more likely to be afflicted by illnesses for which their medications are effective. 55 The fact that the
National Institutes of Health has created a Genomic Data Sharing

49. Bard, supra note 8, at 496-97 (explaining that there have been an estimated
195,000 hospitalizations from “drug-drug interactions” in the United States); Struve, supra
note 26, at 600.
50. See Derek S. Witte, Bleeding Data in a Pool of Sharks: The Anathema of Privacy
in a World of Digital Sharing and Electronic Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 717, 721 (2013);
Rebecca Goldin, Privacy and Our Genes: Is deCODE’s DNA Project ‘Big Brother’ or the
Gateway to a Healthier Future?, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (June 24, 2013),
https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2013/06/24/privacy-and-our-genes-is-decodes-dna-projectbig-brother-or-the-gateway-to-a-healthier-future/#.UpzQLY5n9So [https://perma.cc/5Z3HBBY2] (describing new inferential statistics technology that allows companies to deduce a
person’s genetic code without that person submitting a DNA sample).
51. See supra Part I.
52. Struve, supra note 26, at 600.
53. ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 9; see, e.g., “Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval, Priority Review, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/
Approvals/Fast/default.htm [https://perma.cc/9SJP-PKVT].
54. See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
popclock (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
55. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). See generally Stephanie
Sgambati, New Frontiers of Reprogenetics: SNP Profile Collection and Banking and the Re-

sulting Duties in Medical Malpractice, Issues in Property Rights of Genetic Materials, and
Liabilities in Genetic Privacy, 27 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 55 (2012); Witte, supra note 50.
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policy emphasizes the gravity of widespread data sharing.56 With the
innovations in private data collection that can be used for targeted
advertising (and research), important rights that are designed to protect the general public must be considered.
Data pooling is known more generally as “big data”; this phenomenon has gained so much public recognition that in 2013, the Oxford
English Dictionary published its definition. 57 According to the dictionary, “big data” refers to “[e]xtremely large data sets that may be
analysed computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially relating to human behaviour and interactions.” 58 As
the definition implies, a quick internet search will reveal that there
are many different types of big data pools that correspond to the
types of behaviors being monitored and the industries that are seeking the data. An average technologically literate person today understands that websites are constantly collecting individuals’ internet
activity. Anyone with a Facebook account knows that the information
they search for using Google is not private and that their search history is for sale to be used by companies—like Facebook—to advertise
products to them.
It appears the only legal restrictions on the collection of personal
information from internet activity are that (a) the customer consents
to have his or her data collected and (b) the data collection practices,
or “privacy policy,” of the company collecting the information be consistent and transparent.59 It seems the only way companies can violate the Electronic Communications and Privacy Act is to share customers’ data without their lawful consent, 60 which is given by agreeing to the terms and conditions of the website. The advent of cloud
technology has given rise to a general paranoia about the safety of
American privacy. 61 It is easy to see how valuable the search information of customers using Google or other large search engines
would be to pharmaceutical companies; for example, if a prospective
pharmaceutical customer is searching symptoms, that person’s
search history would be an incredibly valuable advertising tool to
56. NIH Genomic Data Sharing, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, OFF. SCI. POL’Y,
https://osp.od.nih.gov/scientific-sharing/genomic-data-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/L25M-8YV2].
57. See Todd Wasserman, Oxford English Dictionary Adds ‘Crowdsourcing,’ ‘Big Data’, MASHABLE (June 13, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/06/13/dictionary-new-words2013/#6YM z729hPPqm [https://perma.cc/7C7X-YLJZ].
58. Big data, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/big_data
[https://perma.cc/3KPZ-Q269].
59. Witte, supra note 50, at 722-24.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2012).
61. See generally Witte, supra note 50 (explaining the prevalence of cloud storage
systems and their vulnerability to being accessed by third parties).
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have. This kind of information could bring a new dimension to generic and originator competition.
A more specific type of data pool that is of special interest to Big
Pharma is the storage of genetic and patient / research participant
information on cloud-type data pools. 62 deCODE genetics, Inc. is an
Icelandic company that uses inferential statistics to identify the genetic predisposition of the entire Icelandic population by collecting
the DNA of a critical mass of the population (around fifty percent of
Icelanders). 63 While this technology obviously has beneficial implications for population health—namely, the ability to calculate the likelihood of any individual contracting a chronic, genetic disease—there
are many legal and ethical stumbling blocks that lay ahead of companies like deCODE before the technology can ever be fully utilized.64
The Icelandic population and government have been hesitant to allow
deCODE to reveal the results of their statistical deductions for the
entire population,65 which the founder laments as “a crime” against
the public welfare. 66
deCODE’s founder’s choice of words is provocative and arguably
strikes at the heart of the issue with inferential statistics and notions
of privacy, especially in Western societies. He sees, whether sincerely
or somewhat hyperbolically, being prohibited from sharing with individuals (who have never submitted genetic material for, let alone
consented to, genetic testing) information that is potentially dispositive to their health and longevity as a criminal act. 67 However, according to the principles of informed consent, statutes, and the decisions of government agencies, it would be the sharing of that information with the individuals in question (without consent) that may
be criminal. The “Common Rule” promulgates guidelines by which

62. See Goldin, supra note 50 (explaining that electronic storage of medical records
coupled with the genetic information from communities of volunteers could provide unprecedented insight into tailoring health responses).
63. Antonio Regalado, Genome Study Predicts DNA of the Whole of Iceland, MIT
TECH. REV. (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/536096/genome-studypredicts-dna-of-the-whole-of-iceland/ [https://perma.cc/RHY2-YEBU]; Unrivaled Capabilities, DECODE GENETICS, http://www.decode.com/research/ [https://perma.cc/V56P-AXJW].
64. Regalado, supra note 63 (describing the right not to know and how traditional
notions of informed consent will be altered in light of deCODE’s technology that can identify people and use their genetic information without them even participating in studies).
65. Goldin, supra note 50.
66. Carl Zimmer, In Iceland’s DNA, New Clues to Disease-Causing Genes, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/science/in-icelands-dna-clues-towhat-genes-may-cause-disease.html?_r=0 (“It’s a crime not to approach these people” (quoting Dr. Kari Stefansson)).
67. Id.
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research is to be conducted. 68 Among many other guidelines for research practices, the Common Rule addresses standards and,
through adoption by research funders and regulators, requirements
for informed consent. 69 Research subjects, among other things, must
be informed of the basic parameters and methods of the study, of the
possible risks involved, and that participation is voluntary.70 In a situation like deCODE’s studies, where people become subjects through
identification by inferential statistics, there cannot possibly be informed consent. According to 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, which is the incorporation of the Common Rule by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), any research that involves the expenditure of federal
dollars or research that is subject to federal regulation must adhere
to strict guidelines for conducting studies that involve human subjects, including informed consent.71 It is important to note that the
FDA has largely adopted this regulation, requiring entities that wish
to get their drugs or devices approved to abide by HHS policies.72
Many private research sponsors and a litany of other federal agencies
follow the Common Rule as well.73 However, private research entities
are not required to adhere to the Common Rule.74 This means that for
private companies, like deCODE, collecting identifiable data from research “participants” who have never consented to such research and
have never submitted genetic information is currently legal. To add
fuel to the fire, the marketing of this information to other research entities and corporations is also legal and largely unregulated.75 There
have already been movements and—in the case of countries including
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Iceland—legislation and
administrative promulgations that restrict the scientific community

68. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/
common-rule/index.html [https://perma.cc/D2VN-M225].
69. Id.
70. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2016).
71. Id. § 46.101.
72. See Food & Drug Administration, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/fda/index.html [https://perma.cc/
RY3Q-7HPH].
73. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), supra note 68.
74. See id.
75. See Covered Entities and Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-entities/index.html
[https://perma.cc/
A5YE-5FUR] (listing the entities subject to HIPAA privacy laws—namely, health care
providers, health plans, health care clearinghouses, and the business entities that receive
information from them; however, private entities collecting personal health information are
not covered entities).
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from collecting pools of genetic data for future research because of the
fear that an individual’s DNA cannot be de-identified.76
Interestingly, under the laws of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 77 the only entities that are considered “covered entities,” meaning they have to comply with HIPAA’s
protocols regarding sensitive patient identification, are healthcare
providers (doctors, clinicians, psychologists, etc.), health plans (insurance companies), and health care clearinghouses that store sensitive health information (e.g., the Agency for Healthcare Administration). 78 While private organizations that get sensitive information
from the “covered entities” for the purpose of research or commercial
activity must comply with HIPAA, private research entities and
those that they contract with are under no such obligations.79
At the risk of stating the obvious, deCODE’s findings, and their
ambition to propagate their research to as much of the global community as will accept them, can be incredibly valuable to pharmaceutical companies who can access the information and market
their products to individuals who are deemed to be at risk for diseases that their products are meant to treat. While the research
that pharmaceutical companies conduct when developing drugs is
regulated by the FDA and subject to the Common Rule, there is no
such restriction on post-approval market research for the purpose of
advertising. 80 As noted, there is virtually no mandated protection
for the genetic information of research “subjects” in the private industry; 81 only the ethical disposition of the company doing the research protects subjects’ identifying information from being disseminated to the highest bidder. 82 In such a laissez-faire environment
where an individual’s genetic predisposition may be ascertained
76. See Yaniv Erlich & Arvind Narayanan, Routes for Breaching and Protecting Genetic Privacy, 15 NATURE REV. 409, 409 (2014) (explaining statutes enacted by the United

States and the European Union designed to regulate research and expressing incredulity
about whether genetic data can be deidentified); Sgambati, supra note 55, at 88 (“DNA, by
its very nature, cannot be ‘deidentified’ in the way that traditional data can be and is required to be by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), which review and approve human research.”); id. at 91-95 (describing the Genetic Information Nondisclosure Act and how it
seeks to address genetic information in research, among other fields in which it is used).
77. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
78. See Covered Entities and Business Associates, supra note 75.
79. See id.
80. See ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 9, at 92.
81. See Goldin, supra note 50 (“Iceland’s Data Protection Authority (DPA) ruled that
deCODE needs consent from everyone involved . . . before they can use estimates of nonconsenting individual’s genotypes for ongoing research.”); Regalado, supra note 63 (explaining the ethical principles of informed consent and participant anonymity).
82. Regalado, supra note 64.
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without any volunteered genetic information, the consumer does
have an important right: the right not to know. 83
The new inferential statistics technology that deCODE is employing to identify individuals is limited. It can only predict the likelihood
that an individual will contract a disease.84 The technology does not
yield definitive results about whether a person is going to have the
disease that his or her genes suggest he or she may contract. 85 Craig
Venter, a leader in the genome mapping project of the early twentyfirst century, is quoted as saying, “Either you have something or you
don’t. You don’t have 30 percent of Alzheimer’s.” 86 This limitation on
genome mapping and inferential statistics presents a stumbling block
for pharmaceutical companies that wish to take advantage of it. Theoretically, while the companies may use the information to advertise
to individuals who may be predisposed to contract a disease, they
must be careful not to cross the line into the realm of fraudulent
statements, thus rendering their speech unprotected by the First
Amendment. 87 If a pharmaceutical company advertises to an individual identified through inferential statistics as potentially needing its
product, and the individual did not know that he or she was at risk
for the disease (as most do not, either out of an affirmative desire not
to know or mere indifference), that person would doubtlessly be startled. Such an advertisement may incite the person to see a doctor and
demand treatment that may not be necessary. Needless to say, this
chain of events may produce physical and emotional injury, in addition to the certain violation of the patient’s right not to know and the
dignitary harm that the person may suffer from realizing that his or
her genetic information—which he or she never submitted or consented to being used—is now a commercial good. If in fact the product that a pharmaceutical company advertised was superfluous,
whether or not it was marketed for its FDA-approved use, there may
be cause for legal action against the pharmaceutical company.

83. Berkman & Hull, supra note 5.
84. See Goldin, supra note 50; Liza Gross, The First Individual Genome: One Is the
Loneliest Number, PLOS BIOLOGUE COMMUNITY BLOG (Oct. 21, 2013), http://
blogs.plos.org/biologue/2013/10/21/the-first-individual-genome-one-is-the-loneliest-number/
[https://perma.cc/24FQ-KGSF]; Regalado, supra note 63; Zimmer, supra note 66.
85. See Gross, supra note 84.
86. Id.
87. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563-67 (1980) (explaining that the first prong of the four-part test is to see if the First
Amendment applies (if the statements are truthful and not misleading); if not, then the
FDA can regulate the speech because it is not protected).
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There have been movements for the FDA to tighten its regulation
of pharmaceuticals to preempt negative post-market effects. 88 However, the kind of regulation being proposed focuses on potential
harms of defective drugs. 89 There has not been much focus on the
emotional harms that a potential customer may suffer from being
informed that he or she may have a disease. 90 Most of the focus on
this type of harm is from the perspective of research, 91 not advertisements that induce consumers to demand potentially unnecessary
genetic tests and prescriptions because of targeted advertising from
pharmaceutical companies. It appears the best course of action
against a pharmaceutical company for the type of advertisement described above is through the False Claims Act (FCA); specifically,
subsections 3729(A)(1)(a), (b), and (g). 92 The issue under the FCA becomes whether a pharmaceutical company’s advertisement of a drug
to a potential customer, who has the genetic determinants of a disease without having the disease or being certain to contract it, constitutes fraud. The knowledge standard under the FCA includes recklessness or deliberate ignorance of the truth behind the claims; intent
to defraud is not an element of an FCA claim.93 Therefore, it may arguably come down to the degree of certainty to which a specific genetic marker predicts a corresponding disease, or a question of how precise and developed the science of genome mapping is, which could be
costly for plaintiffs and defendants to establish at trial through expert witness testimony.
To avoid the potential aforementioned liability, pharmaceutical
companies may look to physicians for medical records and prescription logs and advertise their products to the doctors who have the
highest need for them. 94 Pharmacy data mining companies that contract their services to pharmaceutical companies have already successfully challenged laws abridging the flow of physician and pharmacist prescription records.95 If a pharmaceutical company had the
ambition, it could create a cloud-like database of national prescrip88. Struve, supra note 26, at 591 (explaining that there have been calls for the FDA to
bolster its regulation of pharmaceuticals).
89. See id. at 588.
90. Berkman & Hull, supra note 5.
91. Zimmer, supra note 66.
92. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012) (laying out what constitutes fraud under the FCA and
when an entity can be liable by inducing government action or payment).
93. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)-(B).
94. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 552-54 (2011) (holding a Vermont
law banning the flow of physician pharmacy records is an unconstitutional abridgment of
the First Amendment).
95. Id.
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tion practices of physicians to establish a meta-reporting system
analogous to the reporting requirements imposed by the FDA. 96 By
using physicians’ judgments in prescribing off-label as proxies for
their own, pharmaceutical companies may avoid FCA claims and
physicians, in turn, may be on the hook if they are found to meet the
aforementioned FCA knowledge standard.
IV. THE ABILITY OF THE FDA TO MONITOR POST-APPROVAL MARKET
PHARMACEUTICAL ADVERTISEMENT AND USE
The FDA’s primary focus in regulating pharmaceuticals is to ensure the safety and efficacy of drugs before they are approved for sale
and use. 97 The FDA has implemented several reporting mechanisms
for researchers and physicians to monitor adverse drug effects and
interactions in the post-approval market, but underreporting plagues
these mechanisms. 98 The FDA is also inundated with reports of drug
interactions that are unfounded or superfluous. 99 The task of parsing
out legitimate reports from unfounded ones has been described by the
FDA as “the proverbial search for a needle in a haystack . . . [m]ore
work in this area is needed.” 100 The most obvious limitation on the
FDA’s power to monitor post-approval market pharmaceutical effects
and interactions is logistical: the FDA has a finite amount of resources with which to monitor pharmaceutical safety and interactions after approval. 101 Monitoring the safety of pharmaceuticals once
approved for market use is also a remedial process, meaning that the
FDA cannot act to make drugs safer until it realizes that the drugs
are harmful in the first place, which can only happen when adverse
drug reactions are reported. 102
Reporting of adverse effects is largely done by doctors. 103 The FDA
requires pharmaceutical companies to disclaim potential adverse ef96. Struve, supra note 26, at 601-07.
97. Id. at 605 n.83 (“[T]he FDA only devotes the equivalent of fifty-five full-time employees to post-approval surveillance, as compared with over 1700 full-time equivalents
engaged in pre-market review of new drug applications.” (quoting Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing Experimental Data to Promote Patient Welfare, 49
CATH. U. L. REV. 449, 452 (2000)).
98. Id. at 602-05.
99. Id. at 604.
100. Id. (quoting TASK FORCE ON RISK MGMT., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MANAGING THE RISKS
FROM MEDICAL PRODUCT USE: CREATING A RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 67-68 (1999)).
101. Id. at 605.
102. Bard, supra note 8, at 497.
103. See Katrin Weighmann, Consumer Reporting of Adverse Drug Reactions, EMBO Reports 949 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4931570/#embr201642616-bib0005 [https://perma.cc/EU82-9JS3] (footnote five and accompanying text explain that consumer reporting is higher in countries that have long-established consumer reporting sys-
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fects of drugs in the form of warning labels. 104 This is the only mechanism by which the FDA can compel legal commercial speech. 105 The
labels are the only mechanism by which lay doctors 106 are informed of
a new drug’s potential negative effects, which are usually explained
by the pharmaceutical representatives who advertise the products to
them. 107 The only data that the labels are based on are produced from
the clinical trials conducted by the pharmaceutical companies, and
the labels are aimed at the FDA-approved (or labeled) use of the
drug. However, as discussed above, pharmaceutical companies have
the power to advertise off-label uses of drugs, which are not contemplated by the labels. 108 Therefore, the doctors who are dispensing
newly approved drugs, and who are in the best position to observe
and report adverse drug incidents, do not have any special knowledge
about how the drugs may interact with other drugs or diseases that
they were not approved to treat. This can cause adverse drug reactions to be over- or underreported. 109 Doctors may also be unaware of
medications that patients have been prescribed from other
healthcare providers that could interact with new medications in unforeseen and adverse ways. 110
The FDA may be able to circumvent its reliance on physician and
pharmaceutical company reporting (which is spotty, at best) by establishing reporting mechanisms through the pharmacies that administer the drugs. These entities do not have the same financial interest
or fear of liability that doctors and pharmaceutical companies have
for reporting adverse events because they are not prescribing medication or investing billions of dollars into research, development, and
patents for the drugs. There are already mandates by which pharmacies track prescription and certain over-the-counter purchases, such
as pseudoephedrine. 111 Similarly to private data mining companies
tems); see also Margaff F and Bertram D, Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting by Patients: An
Overview of Fifty Countries, DRUG SAFETY 409-419 (2014) (surveying fifty countries with

patient reporting regimes and finding that patients comprised nine percent of reports).
104. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: ADVERSE REACTIONS SECTION OF LABELING FOR HUMAN PRESCRIPTION DRUG
AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS—CONTENT AND FORMAT 2 (2006), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM075057.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2W76-KBAB].
105. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
106. Those who are not experts in the class of drugs that the pharmaceutical belongs to
or those who have not participated in the development of the specific drug.
107. Bard, supra note 8, at 517.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
109. Bard, supra note 8, at 518-20.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 521 n.77; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, PHARMACIST’S
MANUAL: AN INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 11, 55-58 (2010),
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that collect personal information and amass it into large pools that
can then be sold to a number of companies for any number of reasons,
the FDA could also create a data pool to which pharmacies could report their prescription history. The FDA could analyze the data to
create a profile of every person taking a legally prescribed medication
and then distribute patient profiles to doctors and hospitals within
the geographic area of each patient—thereby enabling medical professionals to be more informed about the medications their patients
are taking and better able to identify adverse drug reactions and interactions. This project would be a mammoth undertaking that would
require the FDA to restructure its focus and distribution of resources.
Even if the FDA were able to accomplish this task, the system would
still largely depend on physician discretion to report adverse drug
reactions. It may even have the effect of inciting overreporting because, with a list of all the medications that a patient is taking, physicians may be more paranoid that the symptoms the patient is complaining of are due to adverse drug interactions.
Through the MedWatch program, patients can directly report adverse effects to the agency; however, this form is complicated, and it
is unlikely that they will voluntarily report adverse incidents. 112 Patients may not know that the symptoms they are experiencing are
provoked by the drug they are prescribed, especially if it is not a documented symptom of the new drug. Patients may also be hesitant to
report adverse drug effects out of fear that the incident was brought
on by inappropriate use of the drug, interactions with illegal drugs,
or with other prescription drugs that they are taking illegally. This
would compromise the effectiveness of the prescription data pools
described above. In the case of patients with serious medical conditions for which there are few treatments, they may not wish to report
adverse effects of new drugs to the FDA out of fear that the agency
will revoke approval and their disease would worsen.
V. CONCLUSION
The current legal and practical framework of pharmaceutical advertising capabilities and the FDA’s ability to regulate the postapproval market stacks the deck in favor of pharmaceutical companies and against the best interest of public health. Between the statistical inference software that can deduce an individual’s genetic
makeup without that person so much as submitting a cheek swab
and the ability of pharmaceutical companies to advertise off-label,
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pharm2/pharm_manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A8GU-BZDY].
112. Bard, supra note 8, at 522.
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unapproved uses of their drugs, the FDA’s power to monitor adverse
drug interactions and reactions is abysmal. The limited clinical trial
process, which is supervised almost exclusively by private entities, is
designed to establish drug safety and efficacy but does not paint a
realistic picture of how drugs will behave in a post-approval market
where they interact with other drugs, are prescribed for uses other
than that for which they are approved, and used for decades on end.
However, with a lengthy, intra-agency approval process that involves expensive research, development, and patent applications, it is
difficult to justify a more stringent or drawn-out approval process.
There is pressure on the FDA to simultaneously expedite the approval process and ensure drug safety. 113 With an ever-growing population and increasing numbers of pharmaceutical products on the market, the FDA is overwhelmed and cannot effectively monitor the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals. It has become more of a fire department than a watchdog, responding to drug safety concerns only
after the damage has been done, rather than prophylactically ensuring drug safety as it has done in the past.114 To confound this trend,
the ability of pharmaceutical companies to advertise unapproved, offlabel uses of their medications once the FDA approves them undermines the agency’s ability to even ensure the safety and efficacy of
the drugs in the preapproval clinical setting. It is practically impossible for the FDA to contemplate all the uses that a drug may have in
clinical trial stages, especially when the trials are conducted by private entities who are not obligated to be completely transparent.
There is also no feasible way for the FDA to mandate that pharmaceutical companies test for potential drug interactions that may manifest once the drugs hit the market.
The only viable options the FDA has regarding post-approval
market surveillance and regulation are to require pharmaceutical
companies to continue to conduct clinical trials after the drug is approved and in the market, 115 create a massive data pool through
which the FDA can quickly identify adverse drug reactions and interactions, 116 or impose some sort of penalty system whereby phar113. See ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 9, at 93 (explaining that the FDA has been influenced by pressure from pharmaceutical companies to hastily approve a number of
drugs); Bard, supra note 8, at 496-97 (noting the number of drug-drug interactions that
have resulted in hospitalizations and emergency room visits).
114. See ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 9, at 96 (describing how Dr. Kelsey, the FDA
assessor at the time, protected the United States from the thalidomide disaster).
115. Bard, supra note 8, at 509-10 (explaining that the FDA has this power but it has
not exercised it yet).
116. See supra Part III (noting that the practicality of this system is compromised by
faulty reporting mechanisms and people taking illegal drugs or approved drugs that are
not prescribed to them).
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maceutical companies whose off-label advertising leads to adverse
effects must pay into a federal fund that compensates people for such
injuries. This last possibility would likely be technically permissible
through the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, provided that Congress authorizes the FDA to implement such a plan;
however, it would likely disincentivize reporting of adverse drug effects by pharmaceutical companies, which would undermine the purpose of the fund.
In deciding which avenue to pursue, it is important to keep in
mind that as with all entities that promote public health, the FDA is
constrained by the Constitution of the United States; namely, the
First and Fourth Amendments,117 the general principle of least restrictive means or alternatives,118 and, relatedly, principles of federalism.119 These measures are in place to protect the public from oppressive government action; however, in emergency situations, the government’s power can be expanded to encroach upon individual liberties in otherwise impermissible ways.120 The prevalence of pharmaceutical use and the potential magnitude of public harm could arguably constitute a state of emergency, whereby the FDA can abridge the
First Amendment rights of pharmaceutical companies to advertise
off-label and tighten reporting standards.
The FDA is currently suffering from an identity crisis. It is facing
a runaway train of new drugs and drug interactions that it cannot
possibly anticipate or monitor. Yet the FDA allows for expedited approval of drugs in emergency situations and drugs that are intended
to treat serious conditions, allowing even less-well-known drugs into
the post-approval market. 121 As an agency charged with protecting
the public from dangerous foods, drugs, and medical devices, the FDA
focuses its pharmaceutical regulatory efforts on preapproval clinical
drug research—a setting where drugs have the least potential to do
harm. It appears that the FDA is hogtied by constitutional principles
and political checks on its authority. However, it has been repeated
throughout the twentieth century that the Constitution is not a sui-

117. See supra Parts I & II.
118. A common legal doctrine that when acting, the government should do so in a way
that least affects fundamental rights and notions of privacy and free will.
119. The notion that states know what is best for their citizens and that the federal
government should be limited in the state’s power to affect state law and state citizens.
120. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (holding that while racial classifications are subject to the highest level of scrutiny and presumptively unconstitutional, the interment of the plaintiff was permissible in light of executive emergency powers).
121. FDA’s Role in Public Health, supra note 16 (explaining that there are expedited
review procedures for drugs based on the need for them).
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cide pact. 122 The FDA and Big Pharma are currently in a lion fight
over their stake in America’s health. Do we want to promote a capitalistic market where pharmaceutical companies have unbridled autonomy in promoting drugs to us once approved by the FDA? Or do
we want the FDA to have greater authority over the post-approval
market, at the cost of some of our personal liberties? While the question implies a right answer (specifically, that the FDA should regulate post-approval advertising more closely), the solution is far from
ideal or intuitive. The FDA does not currently have the authority or
the means to keep up with Big Pharma, and it is costing the American public more than just co-pays.

122. Linda Greenhouse, The Nation; ‘Suicide Pact’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/22/weekinreview/the-nation-suicide-pact.html.

